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The process of capturing and entrenching fundamental 
rights remains very much a live one in both New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom. In both countries there is pressure 
to move on from the current bill of rights legislation: the UK 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). While the two jurisdictions 
are subject to quite different political and cultural pressures, 
there remains a great deal of scope for exchange of ideas and 
experiences. 
in the HRA, what I will call for ease the 
‘declaration of incompatibility model’. 
To meet the objectives identified by the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel, New 
Zealand should go a step further than 
the UK in protecting human rights 
against legislative encroachment. The 
declaration of incompatibility model is 
unprincipled and unfair, and, moreover, 
is not a particularly effective mechanism 
for securing compliance of the legislature 
with protected rights through the courts. 
It serves as a useful constitutional fall-
back or placeholder, which is the function 
it performs in the UK; it should not be 
viewed as a principled destination for 
constitutional reform. 
These arguments challenge the 
views of many that the declaration of 
incompatibility model is both principled 
and effective, including the views of 
a number of scholars whose writings 
portray it as inculcating a form of debate 
or ‘dialogue’ with political branches. In 
challenging this view I want not only to 
draw attention to the theoretical problems 
with such a view, but also to descend 
from the ivory towers of constitutional 
and political theorists to consider how 
the model operates in practice and its 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
going beyond 
declarations
The Constitutional Advisory Panel 
report has recommended that the New 
Zealand government set up a process with 
public consultation and participation to 
examine options for, among other things, 
improving compliance by the executive 
and Parliament with standards contained 
in the NZBORA (or, by implication, 
any future bill of rights) and giving the 
judiciary powers to review legislation 
for	 consistency	 with	 the	 NZBORA.	 My	
argument is that New Zealand should 
not be persuaded to adopt the approach 
to judicial review of legislation found 
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practical deficiencies as a mechanism of 
ensuring that legislation is human rights 
compliant. 
The declaration of incompatibility model 
Two features of the HRA are relevant to 
present discussions. The first relates to 
the nature of the rights to which it gives 
effect. These are the rights set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
Most	 of	 ‘the	 Convention	 rights’,	 as	 the	
act describes them – albeit not quite all 
of them – are scheduled to the HRA and 
given effect by section 2. 
The second feature of the HRA that I 
wish to highlight is the manner in which 
it gives effect to the convention rights. It 
does	 so	 in	 three	 ways.	 Section	 6	 of	 the	
HRA makes it unlawful for any public 
authority to act incompatibly with the 
convention rights. Section 3 of the HRA 
requires all legislation to be read as far as 
it is possible to do so in a manner that 
is compatible with the convention rights. 
Finally, section 4 of the HRA allows 
higher courts in the UK to make a formal 
declaration that primary legislation does 
not comply with a convention right. The 
way this was reconciled with parliamentary 
sovereignty was by the stipulation 
that such a declaration does not affect 
the ‘validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement’	 of	 that	 legislation	 (s.4(6)
(a)) and ‘is not binding on the parties 
to the proceedings in which it is made’ 
(s.4(6)(b)).	 It	 is	 this	 final	 ‘declaratory’	
feature of the HRA that I wish to focus 
on most directly.
Legislative compatibility with protected 
rights
Let me turn then to New Zealand. In its 
report the Constitutional Advisory Panel 
registered support in New Zealand for 
‘exploring increased judicial powers that 
preserve parliamentary sovereignty … to 
ensure legislation is consistent’ with the 
NZBORA (Constitutional Advisory Panel, 
2013,	p.56).	The	NZBORA	does	not	contain	
any express mechanism for scrutinising 
legislation and this is an obvious area 
for considering enhancement. Such a 
power would also tie in with another of 
the panel’s recommendations, which is to 
improve compliance by Parliament with 
the standards set out in the NZBORA. 
In these comments the Constitutional 
Advisory Panel has, I suggest, nodded 
in the direction of the HRA and the 
power provided by section 4 for courts to 
declare primary legislation incompatible 
with the convention rights. While there is 
no such power in the NZBORA, the New 
Zealand courts have nonetheless taken a 
significant step in this direction, holding 
that the courts will indicate whether a 
particular legislative provision constitutes 
a justified limitation on a protected right 
in circumstances in which it is unable 
give the legislation a rights-consistent 
reading	under	section	6	of	the	NZBORA.	
The courts have said that they will give 
such an indication for the benefit of the 
New Zealand Parliament, society as a 
whole and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee.1 In R v Hansen, Justice 
McGrath	 stated	 that	 ‘a	 New	 Zealand	
court must never shirk its responsibility 
to indicate, in any case where it concludes 
that the measure being considered is 
inconsistent with protected rights, that 
… there is a measure on the statute book 
which infringes protective rights and 
freedoms’. He also went as far as to say 
that there is a ‘reasonable constitutional 
expectation that there will be a reappraisal’ 
of the measure by the government and 
the executive.2 It has even been suggested 
that in an appropriate case the court 
might make a more formal declaration 
recording the fact that the legislation has 
been found to be inconsistent with the 
NZBORA, although the jurisdiction to 
do so has not yet been determined.3
This nonetheless falls short of a 
declaration of incompatibility in two 
important respects. First, the courts’ 
responsibility to provide an advisory 
indication was expressed by Justice 
McGrath	 as	 arising	 in	 any	 case	 in	which	
it is considering whether legislation can 
be read compatibly with protected rights 
under	 section	 6	 but	 concludes	 that	 it	
cannot be. On this approach, a claim 
cannot be brought squarely challenging 
legislation as contrary to protected rights. 
In an excellent article, Claudia Geiringer 
has suggested that the advisory indication 
might be sufficiently elastic to provide 
courts with a freestanding jurisdiction 
to make declarations of inconsistency 
(Geiringer, 2009). But that is not presently 
the law, as Geiringer herself accepts. In R 
v Manawatu the Supreme Court refused 
permission to challenge legislation 
concerned with criminal appeals, noting: 
‘It is not suggested that it is open to the 
Court to interpret the legislation in a 
way that would be more consistent with 
rights protected by the Bill of Rights’, and 
therefore the court had no jurisdiction.4 
There is thus no mechanism under the 
NZBORA to bring a challenge on the 
ground that legislation is not compatible 
with protected rights, as opposed to a 
challenge claiming that it can be made 
compatible. 
From my admittedly distant 
perspective as an English lawyer, it would 
seem very difficult for the courts to create 
such a right of action – which is really 
what it would amount to – that the New 
Zealand Parliament has not seen fit to 
include in the NZBORA. The fact that 
bill of rights reform continues to be a live 
issue, and the fact that such declaratory 
powers have been expressly included 
in the HRA and the two subsequent 
Australian bills of rights, makes such a 
judicial innovation even more unlikely 
because it underscores the fact that it is 
a matter for legislative and not judicial 
innovation.
There is thus no mechanism under the NZBORA to 
bring a challenge on the ground that legislation is 
not compatible with protected rights, as opposed 
to a challenge claiming that it can be made 
compatible.
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There is also an important practical 
issue here. Unless a rights-consistent 
interpretation has substantial merit, 
litigants are unlikely to bring proceedings 
if all they are likely to end up with is 
an advisory indication in a judgment 
dismissing their case. All they will have to 
take away with them is a judgment of the 
court that records their lack of success 
and the fact that the legislation itself 
authorises a violation of protected rights. 
Furthermore, since the costs rule in 
New Zealand is the same as in England, 
namely that costs follow the event, this 
holds the consequence that if a litigant 
fails to obtain a favourable reading of 
legislation	 under	 section	 6	 they	 will	 be	
liable not only for their costs but for the 
costs of the other side, since they will 
have lost the case. A litigant who obtains 
a judgment that contains an advisory 
indication that legislation is contrary 
to protected rights will not only come 
away empty-handed; they will come away 
empty-pocketed as well. If declarations 
of incompatibility under the HRA are, 
as they have been aptly described by one 
commentator, a constitutional ‘booby 
prize’ (Leigh, 2002, p.324), an advisory 
indication under the NZBORA – at least 
in their current form – is little more than 
a constitutional custard pie.
Any present jurisdiction of the 
New Zealand courts to give advisory 
indications is therefore necessarily far 
more circumscribed in law and in its 
practical availability than a declaration 
of incompatibility under the HRA. 
Indeed, I suggest that in reality it is no 
different from the ability of courts in 
any case to state that a statute that falls 
to be applied in that case causes unjust 
or unintended effects. Judicial statements 
of this kind are not uncommon, they are 
not by any means exclusively a public law 
phenomenon, and they often provoke 
legislative reform. But no well-advised 
litigant would bring a claim in the hope 
of getting such a helpful comment from a 
judge in the course of losing a case. 
The second reason that the position in 
New Zealand is substantially different to 
the declaration of incompatibility model 
is that declarations of incompatibility in 
the UK are not entirely devoid of legal 
effect. When made, they trigger a power, 
contained in section 10 of the HRA, for 
the executive to make amendments to 
offending legislation by way of statutory 
instrument if there are compelling 
reasons for doing so. This is a significant 
feature of the HRA and one that has been 
under-analysed. It has much in common 
with section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972, which permits 
amendments to primary legislation by 
way of statutory instrument to give effect 
to European Union law. Section 2(2) 
of that act provides a mechanism for 
making necessary changes required by 
EU law; section 4 of the HRA provides a 
mechanism to give effect to the European 
Convention on Human Rights as declared 
domestically or in Strasbourg, at least 
in cases where Parliament cannot be 
expected to act. 
I have previously argued that section 
10 supports the view that the HRA is 
best understood as expressing a form 
of constitutionalism in which the 
government and Parliament should accept 
the findings of courts as to the meaning 
of the convention rights, rather than 
providing, as some have argued, a means 
for engaging in a debate about their scope 
and content (Hickman, 2010, p.83). This 
is because it suggests that declarations of 
incompatibility should lead to a change in 
the law, but since judges are not terribly 
good at writing law, section 10 enables 
this to be done by delegated legislation. 
In relation to New Zealand, the key point 
is that any advisory declarations under 
the NZBORA do not trigger any such 
implementing power. 
Given the current position under 
the NZBORA, it is unsurprising that 
New Zealand would consider following 
the UK in enacting a declaration of 
incompatibility power. Consultation 
of the various UK reports on bills of 
rights would provide support for such a 
move. One 2007 report praised the way 
that the HRA scheme, like other recent 
Commonwealth bills of rights, promotes 
dialogue between the courts and political 
branches, and was favourable to the 
declaration of incompatibility model 
(JUSTICE, 2007). The UK Parliament’s 
Joint Committee on Human Rights stated 
in its 2008 report that going further 
and conferring on the courts a power 
to strike down legislation would be 
‘fundamentally at odds’ with the tradition 
of parliamentary sovereignty, and it 
said the declaration of incompatibility 
was ‘innovative and widely admired’. It 
also recommended the adoption of the 
additional reporting requirement found 
in the Australian Capital Territories 
Human Rights Act 2004 and the Victoria 
Charter,	 2006,	 which	 adopted	 the	
declaration of incompatibility model but 
with some modifications, including a 
requirement for the government to report 
to Parliament when such a declaration 
is made (Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, 2008, para. 218). 
Equally, a recent commission looking 
at a bill of rights for the UK found this 
to be one of the few issues on which its 
members could agree. They reported 
that the declaration of incompatibility 
has been ‘widely seen as striking a 
sophisticated and sensible balance 
between Parliament and the courts’. The 
commission concurred with this view.5
I, however, do not. I do not consider 
that the declaration of incompatibility is 
sophisticated, fair or consistent with the 
constitutional traditions of the UK, or, 
for that matter, New Zealand. Nor do 
I think it is particularly effective. It is a 
fudge. I do not suggest that it is without 
One 2007 report praised the way that the HRA 
scheme, like other recent Commonwealth bills 
of rights, promotes dialogue between the courts 
and political branches, and was favourable to the 
declaration of incompatibility model  ...
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any merit. It has considerable merit. 
But its merit derives from the fact that 
it is a fudge. In my view it is useful as a 
constitutional fall-back solution or – the 
function it currently occupies in the UK – 
as a constitutional placeholder. 
What is wrong with the declaration 
of incompatibility model? The vices are 
principally three. 
Decoupling rights and remedies 
The declaration of incompatibility is 
unfair and unprincipled because it 
denies individuals whose rights have 
been infringed any remedy in domestic 
law, even though the law has been found 
to be contrary to a basic, constitutional 
right. It decouples an individual’s so-
called fundamental right from the ability 
to obtain an effective remedy. Perhaps the 
most stark example of the unprincipled 
nature of this decoupling arises in the 
context of criminal convictions. Without 
a power of invalidation or disapplication 
of legislation which has been found to 
violate a protected right, a defendant 
whose conviction is found to be unfair 
and unsafe because of the necessary effect 
of primary legislation would nonetheless 
stand convicted. 
It might be objected that while it 
might be the case in strict legal terms 
that a declaration of incompatibility does 
not provide a remedy, the substance of 
the position is quite different. It might 
be said that of the 20 declarations of 
incompatibility that had been made in 
the	UK	by	May	2013,	all	but	one	(prisoner	
voting rights) had been the subject of 
either secondary or primary legislation 
removing the violation, or were already 
covered by legislative programmes current 
at the time the declaration was made.
There are four reasons why a focus on 
the political response does not provide an 
answer. The first is that it does not meet 
the point that as a matter of principle it 
is constitutionally unsatisfactory for the 
courts to be given a power to declare 
whether a fundamental right has been 
violated but to deny the courts the power 
to provide a remedy for a violation they 
identify. Section 4 is clear: legislation 
remains in force and effect and the 
declaration is not binding, even on the 
parties. 
It has been suggested that this 
arrangement is in the best traditions of 
the British constitution. I would argue 
that actually it is contrary to our most 
basic constitutional traditions. It is hard 
to find areas of agreement between Dicey 
and Bentham, but one thing they did 
agree on was an opposition to abstract 
declarations of rights that were not legally 
enforceable. Bentham famously described 
them as ‘nonsense upon stilts’ (Bentham, 
1843, p.501). Likewise, Dicey emphasised 
that such declarations were objectionable 
unless the ‘rights of individuals are really 
secure’ through the provision of legal 
remedies. He wrote:
any knowledge of history suffices to 
show that foreign constitutionalists 
have, while occupied in defining 
rights, given insufficient attention 
to the absolute necessity for the 
provision of adequate remedies 
by which the rights they have 
proclaimed might be enforced. 
… On the other hand, there runs 
through the English constitution that 
inseparable connection between the 
means of enforcing a right and the 
right to be enforced … . (Dicey, 1920, 
pp.193-4)
Dicey’s censure of foreign 
proclamations of rights applies equally 
to section 4 of the HRA. Lord Bingham 
more recently expressed this idea in terms 
of a rule of public policy. He said: ‘the 
rule of public policy which has first claim 
on the loyalty of the law’ is ‘that wrongs 
should be remedied’.6
Much	 more	 could	 be	 made	 of	 this	
point, but reference to these authorities 
grounds my submission that the 
correlativity of right and remedy is at 
the heart of our constitutional traditions, 
and that it is associated with an aversion 
to abstract declarations of rights which 
fail to provide concrete benefits to 
individuals. Indeed, it is the essence of 
the rule of law as it has been secured 
and understood under the British 
constitution that individuals can obtain 
relief from the courts where the law is 
infringed; for as long as the courts do 
not have any power to provide a remedy 
for a breach of a right, they are therefore 
placed in a constitutionally unprincipled 
and unsatisfactory situation. 
The second reason why it is no 
answer to look at the legislative and 
executive responses to declarations of 
incompatibility to identify an effective 
remedy is that it remains open to the 
government and Parliament to do nothing 
at all in response to such a declaration. 
It is difficult to regard the mere power 
to provide a remedy as even an effective 
political remedy. This has been recognised 
by the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which has held 
that unless and until individuals can 
be completely confident of receiving a 
satisfactory political response following a 
declaration of incompatibility, section 4 
of the HRA does not provide an effective 
domestic remedy that individuals must 
exhaust before applying to the Strasbourg 
court.7
The third reason why it is no answer 
to look at the political postscript to 
declarations of incompatibility is that 
the political responses to declarations of 
incompatibility are rarely retrospective, 
King has shown that there have been substantial 
periods of delay after declarations of 
incompatibility have been made, ... this ... raises 
serious questions about the compatibility of the 
declaration of incompatibility model with our 
constitutional traditions.
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and therefore they fall short of providing a 
remedy even where they are forthcoming. 
Recent research by Jeff King at University 
College London has shown that of the 
20 declarations of incompatibility then 
made, there is only one instance in which 
remedial legislation following a section 4 
declaration has been retrospective (King, 
2014). 
The fourth point relates to delay. Even 
if a political remedy is forthcoming, it may 
not be forthcoming for a considerable 
period of time. Again, we have the 
benefit of recent empirical work by Jeff 
King to highlight this point. King has 
shown that there have been substantial 
periods of delay after declarations of 
incompatibility have been made, with 
most cases taking over a year to result in 
remedial measures (ibid., pp.7-8). This 
is not a marginal issue, but also raises 
serious questions about the compatibility 
of the declaration of incompatibility 
model with our constitutional traditions. 
Chapter	 29	 of	 the	 Magna	 Carta,	 which	
is still on the statute book, provides: ‘we 
will not deny or defer to any man either 
Justice or Right’.
Incentives to bring claims
Connected to the fact that there is no 
effective remedy for people who obtain 
declarations of incompatibility is the fact 
that there is often a very weak incentive for 
people to bring claims, particularly where 
it is the only remedy they can realistically 
expect to obtain. Therefore, the problem 
is not just that individuals do not get an 
effective remedy if they manage to obtain 
a declaration of incompatibility, but that 
an unknown number of cases never get 
brought before the courts at all because 
of the lack of incentives to litigate. In 
designing a bill of rights which, in the words 
of the Constitutional Advisory Panel, is 
intended to be a tool to ‘assess legislation 
for consistency with the [NZBORA]’ and 
improve ‘compliance by … Parliament with 
the standards in the Act’, it is important 
that potentially rights-defying legislation 
is actually brought before the courts and 
that there is an appropriate balance of 
incentives to ensure this. 
To be sure, the availability of a 
declaration of incompatibility does 
provide something of an incentive; more, 
certainly, than the prospect of an advisory 
indication from the New Zealand courts. 
There are contexts, particularly where 
there are wider interests at stake, where 
claims will be brought merely for a 
declaration of incompatibility in the 
hope of a favourable change in the law. 
Such cases are more likely, certainly in 
England and Wales, where the claimant 
can obtain public funding. Where legal 
aid is available individuals do not have to 
pay their lawyers, and the claimants also 
have costs protection against the costs of 
the other side’s lawyers if the case is lost.8 
Legal aid will sometimes be available, 
particularly in cases where there is a 
wider public interest in the claim because 
of the potential benefits to other people 
if the primary legislation is amended, 
and in such cases there is perhaps more 
prospect of claims being pursued.
However, take the case of an ordinary 
private litigant or company. Ordinarily, 
the costs and risks of public law litigation 
are high for such litigants; they only bring 
claims if faced with little alternative (a 
separate problem which I will reluctantly 
leave aside). But then add to the mix the 
fact that even if such potential litigants 
succeed they will not obtain any remedy 
from the court that will affect their rights 
one jot. Can it really be expected that 
they would bring a claim to the courts for 
a declaration of incompatibility? 
To conclude on this point about 
incentives, I suggest that while the 
declaration of incompatibility model 
might look like a neat way of reconciling 
sovereignty with human rights from a 
distance, or from the ivory towers of the 
academy, one has a different picture if 
you adopt the perspective of a lawyer 
advising his or her clients on whether they 
should litigate in circumstances in which 
primary legislation violates their human 
rights. Looked at from this perspective, the 
declaration of incompatibility does look 
decidedly unappealing; and if that is so, then 
the declaration of incompatibility model, 
although providing better incentives for 
better human rights scrutiny of legislation 
than is found under the NZBORA, still fails 
to provide an effective means of ensuring 
that legislation is human rights compliant.  
Enhancing democratic legitimacy
We have seen that it has been suggested 
that declarations of incompatibility are 
sophisticated. It is said that they locate 
the responsibility for infringements of 
individual rights with Parliament, and it 
is also said that they inculcate a dialogue 
with the political branches. Again, I 
disagree. I will take first the point that 
the declaration of incompatibility model 
locates responsibility for legislative 
infringements of protected rights with 
Parliament. 
Let us assume, as I happen to believe, 
that a democratic principle does tell 
strongly in favour of allowing Parliament 
(although not necessarily acting by simple 
majority) to have the last word on what 
the law should be, and that Parliament 
if it sees fit should be able to enact law 
knowing that it is contrary to fundamental 
rights. The problem with declarations of 
incompatibility is that they do not put the 
ball into Parliament’s court. They trigger 
no more than a power in the government 
to amend the infringing provision. There 
is no mechanism at all for Parliament 
to express the view that it wishes the 
law to remain in its rights-infringing 
state. Although one might assume this 
from its inaction, it would be a dubious 
assumption to make, as in all likelihood 
Parliament would not have considered 
... a democratic principle does tell strongly in 
favour of allowing Parliament ... to have the 
last word on what the law should be, and that 
Parliament if it sees fit should be able to enact law 
knowing that it is contrary to fundamental rights.
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the	 court’s	 judgment.	 Moreover,	 the	
legislation will very likely have been 
enacted together with a declaration 
under section 19(1)(a) of the HRA that 
it is believed to be compatible with 
the European Convention on Human 
Rights. That belief is to be attributed to 
Parliament. If, therefore, it is desirable 
for responsibility for rights-defying laws 
to be located clearly with Parliament, the 
declaration of incompatibility model is 
not fit for purpose because Parliament 
has expressed no such intention, let 
alone done so unequivocally. Parliament 
instead should be required to make clear 
by an affirmative act that it does intend 
the legislation to continue in force, 
notwithstanding that it has been found 
to be incompatible with a protected right. 
This would ensure that Parliament clearly 
endorses and takes responsibility for laws 
that violate basic rights. 
Indeed, the declaration of 
incompatibility is actually less effective at 
enhancing democratic responsibility for 
rights violations than the interpretation 
provision contained in section 3 of the 
HRA	 and	 section	 6	 of	 the	 NZBORA.	
Where the courts invoke these provisions 
to give legislation a rights-compliant 
interpretation, it remains open to 
Parliament to overrule the decision and 
make clear that the rights-violating effect 
is intended. This involves Parliament 
taking responsibility for the law by 
unequivocal positive action. And that will 
require a Parliamentary debate. 
For this reason, to suggest that a section 
4 declaration of incompatibility (which 
results in Parliament taking responsibility 
for rights violations, if it does intend 
them to continue, only by omission) is 
more effective at ensuring that Parliament 
considers and takes responsibility for 
legislation that infringes rights than a 
section 3 read-down seems to me to get 
things the wrong way around. 
To my mind, a better system for 
ensuring that rights-defying laws remain 
law only if Parliament so intends, and 
which locates responsibility for rights-
defying laws with Parliament, is a variant 
of the system under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982. 
That allows courts to invalidate laws, 
but permits legislatures to re-enact 
them, expressly stating that it is being 
done ‘notwithstanding’ that they are not 
compatible with convention rights.9 This 
seems to me to better achieve the objective 
of ensuring Parliament addresses and 
takes responsibility for rights violations, 
and also preserves the ability of 
Parliament to have the last word. It also 
ensures that courts can provide remedies 
in a manner much more consistent with 
our constitutional traditions. 
It is also said that section 4 has the 
happy consequence of enabling a debate 
to take place between Parliament and the 
political branches as to what the scope of 
our rights should be. Stephen Gardbaum 
argues, for instance, that following a 
court pronouncement on legislation, the 
legislature should ‘engage in a serious 
and principled reconsideration of the 
rights issue’ (Gardbaum, 2013, p.89). 
Gardbaum is the latest and one of the 
most sophisticated proponents of this 
view, but this notion of dialogue under 
the HRA has been a common theme in 
academic writing on the HRA since its 
inception. Francesca Klug, for instance, 
has argued that section 4 of the HRA 
enables the courts to generate public 
debate about the scope of human rights 
(Klug, 2001, p.370). Tom Campbell has 
written that under the HRA the courts 
should be ‘regarded as having the right 
to make only provisional determinations’ 
which can ‘be challenged and overturned’ 
by Parliament (Campbell, 2001, p.82).
 I have elsewhere explained why I 
regard this view as misguided and as 
resting on an inaccurate and undesirable 
conception of the separation of powers 
(Hickman, 2010, ch.3; Hickman, 2008). 
There is no difficulty in principle with 
Parliament having a residual power to 
enact legislation in the face of court 
judgments – precisely the power it 
has in respect of common law rights 
– but I do not think court judgments 
should be regarded as mere provisional 
determinations as to the scope or content 
of individual rights. That does not fit with 
what courts do or how they see their role, 
which is to determine what rights are. 
It would also undermine the legitimacy 
of judicial pronouncements if they were 
taken to be mere arguments for others – 
politicians – to accept or reject. 
We must therefore conclude that the 
declaration of incompatibility model 
neither provides a good way of locating 
responsibility for legislation that violates 
fundamental rights with Parliament 
and the political branches, nor has the 
advantage of promoting a beneficial 
dialogue between courts and politicians. 
The new Zealand situation 
Now let us turn to New Zealand. I hope it 
can now be seen that New Zealand should 
be very cautious before going down the 
declaration of incompatibility model 
route. There are a number of reasons why 
it would be more problematic and less 
effective even than it is in the UK. 
First, the context is quite different. 
New Zealand is not facing the problem 
that was addressed by the HRA of 
numerous applications being made 
each year to an international court, the 
judgments of which the government there 
is required to implement. The purpose of 
bill of rights reform is not to give effect 
to international law, but to develop the 
constitutional evolution of New Zealand 
(of course this must be consistent with 
New Zealand’s international obligations, 
but that is rather different). 
The purpose of bill of rights reform is not to 
give effect to international law, but to develop 
the constitutional evolution of New Zealand (of 
course this must be consistent with New Zealand’s 
international obligations, but that is rather 
different). 
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Second, there is also not the same safety 
net in New Zealand of an international 
court able to provide an individual 
remedy where the continuing effect of 
primary legislation denies an individual 
a remedy in the case brought before the 
New Zealand courts. In New Zealand a 
declaration of incompatibility would be 
the end of the road: consideration by the 
UN Human Rights Committee (which 
is not a court, which is not binding and 
which confers remedies) is not equivalent 
to an application to the European Court 
of Human Rights. The absence of a 
remedy issue is therefore more acute in 
New Zealand.
Third, the absence of an incentive for 
claims to be brought to test legislation 
would also be more pronounced in New 
Zealand. Two incentives that have played 
a part in litigation in the UK – the ability 
to disapply legislation within the scope 
of EU law; and the need to exhaust 
remedies under article 34 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights – do not 
arise in New Zealand. While there would 
be some cases brought and there would 
be more of an incentive for claims to test 
legislation than there is currently under 
the NZBORA, it is still likely to provide 
a very patchy approach to human rights 
protection.  
I emphasise that these three points do 
not exhaust the reasons for not adopting 
a declaration of incompatibility; they 
compound the problems and deficiencies 
that are to be found in the declaration of 
incompatibility as it operates in the UK 
which I have set out above. 
Tested against the objectives identified 
by the Constitutional Advisory Panel of 
an enhanced judicial power to ensure 
legislation complies with protected 
rights and that there are effective means 
of ensuring that Parliament complies 
with standards in the bill of rights, the 
declaration of incompatibility does not, I 
suggest, make the grade. 
conclusion 
I hope I have said enough to suggest at least 
that New Zealand should be very cautious 
before adopting the mechanism for 
protecting human rights against legislative 
curtailment found in the HRA as a means 
of meeting the objectives identified in the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel report. The 
declaration of incompatibility model was 
developed in the context of the system of 
individual petition to the European Court 
of Human Rights, which does not pertain 
in New Zealand. As a system of giving 
effect to constitutionally protected rights, 
the declaration of incompatibility model, 
I have argued, is unfair, unprincipled 
and not particularly effective as a 
means of ensuring legislation is rights-
compliant. The benefit of the declaration 
of incompatibility model is that it forms 
a reasonably workable placeholder in an 
ongoing process of constitutionalising 
human rights. But New Zealand 
should have higher ambitions. The 
Constitutional Advisory Panel report has 
higher ambitions for New Zealand. New 
Zealand already has a non-entrenched, 
non-supreme bill of rights. I doubt that it 
needs another one. 
To contend that New Zealand, or 
the UK, should give fundamental rights 
entrenched and higher-order protection 
is not radical. Far from it: of the 53 
members of the Commonwealth, almost 
every one gives fundamental rights such 
status in their law; a number still have 
final appeals in the UK before the very 
judges that decide the cases under the 
HRA (Leckey, 2015, ch.3). New Zealand 
and the UK, together with Australia, are 
outliers. New Zealand set the pace for the 
UK and Australia back in 1990. In this 
article I have set out the case for it doing 
so again.  
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